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ON THE COLD, DESOLATE, wind-swept shore of
Hudson Bay, winters were long and there was nothing
but brandy and talk to relieve the boredom of the
endless ice and the interminable meals of salt geese and
dried pease. Tempers grew shorter as the winter
lengthened and the new recruits succumbed to the
bottle and inevitable melancholia. Rebellions brewed
and violence was too often the order of the day. Only a
few found life even tolerable. These few lived a careful
compromise between the heavily regulated life of the
Company fort and the freedom offered by the camps
of the 'Home Guard' Indians — those Indians who
lived near the fort year-round and provided local food
supplies to the Company.
While the communities that emerged in the 1730s at
the Bayside might be dismissed as of interest only to
the antiquarian intent on examining the minutiae of
the fur trade, their study has broader implications.
They fit in the tradition of the single-resource
communities that make up the mid-Canada corridor,
ranging from eighteenth-century Moose Factory to
the nineteenth-century gold camps of the Klondike.
All had economies based on the extraction or
collection of a single staple, and all were dominated by
a few large companies whose organization dictated the
social structure of the communities they created.
Because of their isolation, physical unpleasantness,
the finite nature of their resource base, and the
consequent reluctance of many labourers to do
anything but acquire enough to retire 'back home', the
societies that they contained were to a large degree
unstable, transitory and dominated by the single
working male.
Doubtless some men from each isolated staple
community managed to create new lives centred on the
hinterland. At Moose the more adaptable among the
servants married Indian women, had children, trapped
furs, and abandoned close connections with the Old
World. To them the Company became only a supplier
of the goods that remained essential to their survival.
By 1740 a significant portion of the trade was
generated by 'the corruptors', as those who had 'gone
Indian' were called. It is difficult to determine exactly
how the new staple society of the Bayside functioned.
Those at Moose, for example, were careful not to
reveal too much, wary that London might censure.
Only when new, inexperienced chief factors bent on
reform were appointed, do the daily journals become
revealing. James Duffield was one such garrulous
reformer and he nearly forced the destruction of the
half-European, half-Indian way of life which had
emerged at Moose by the 1740s. His journals, filled
with paranoia and rebellion, tell much about the staple
society of Moose in the 1740s.
The problems faced by staple communities centred
on removing men from one social setting, like pre-
industrial England, and placing them in a radically
different environment, at once isolated, unnatural and
intensely regimented as it was at Moose Factory.
Unable to come to grips with the cold and the tyranny,
most found escape in drink. Alcoholism was the
principal social problem of those resident at the
Bayside. Indeed, for some, alcohol was the object of all
activity. The surgeon at Moose for one was a
'Compleate Swob' constantly thirsting for liquor.
Many of the work accidents at Moose were alcohol-
related. One man consumed so much 'bumbo' — that
fur-trade mixture of rum, water, sugar and nutmeg —
that he fell off the sloop and promptly drowned. With
some regret and much haste his mates lost no time in
auctioning off the contents of his chest. The chief
factors were always afraid that the men on watch, who
were too often drunk, would, spitefully or accident-
ally, set fire to the buildings. The courage to commit
suicide could also be found in the bottle. 'Brandy-
death' was common, and known in Rupert's Land as
a Northwester's Death.
The Company was understandably concerned at the
loss of life and work caused by this constant guzzling.
Almost annually the chief factors were instructed to
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reduce the quantity of alcohol consumed by the
servants, but they were only occasionally successful.
When James Knight in 1715 refused to issue the
normal ration of bumbo to his men they called him —
among other things — a 'lyeing Old Rogue'. No doubt
Richard Staunton suffered the same abuse when he
tried in 1738 to limit alcohol to 'one bottle at a time
betwixt four men and that only at Seasonable times'.
He was also unsuccessful.
Logically, the Company could have regulated
brandy consumption simply by refusing to supply it in
any significant quantities; however, communications
with the Bay were controlled by the captains of the
Company's annual ships and it was relatively easy for
them to take on a few hundred extra gallons. The
factor's refusal to land the brandy would have sparked
a rebellion headed by the captain and supported by the
servants and the ship's crew. Most chief factors alleged
that the 'private brandy' at the Bottom of the Bay was
traded to the servants by the captains and their crews
in exchange for illicitly obtained furs, but often it was
simply sold. Of course since the captains were usually
the agents for the private affairs of the servants, it was
a simple matter to arrange payment. It was also
rumoured that the captains sometimes ransomed the
annual supplies to the chief factor. If the factor did not
allow a trade in brandy the annual cargoes would not
be landed. Should the chief factors report the
incidents, the letters of complaint could be intercepted
or simply denied. While it seems likely that blatant
blackmail was rare, it would not be too much to
suppose that in order to keep peace amongst his men,
each chief factor had to reach his own informal
understanding with the captains.
While alcohol was the principal social problem at
the Bottom of the Bay, the moral indignation of the
chief factors was aroused by others which they viewed
with even greater alarm. Many of the servants were
less than enamoured with the prospect of the five years
of chastity, obedience and poverty that the Company's
service seemed to demand. In response, some 'went
native'. They learned Indian languages, became
conversant with Indian customs, became adept at the
trapline, and quite often married into Indian families,
fathering and otherwise acquiring numerous
dependents. The greatest of the 'corruptors' (as those
who had 'gone country' were inevitably called) was
Augustin Frost of York, and later Moose Factory.
Frost was a very quiet man, knowledgeable in all the
Indian ways and connected to a number of Indian
women who ran his traplines. Frost was indispensable
to the fort's trade and country supplies, married as he
was to the daughter of the captain of one of the groups
of Home Guard Indians, old Muccatoon (Nimitikige).
The captain and his two sons Pasqueijo and
Messhacopway brought food and provisions to the
post in return for the security and prestige afforded by
post connections. So influential was Frost's example
that he was credited with the 'corruption' of a whole
generation of servants.
In fact, by the 1730s Moose had become an'Indian
Factory' and most of the men allowed their families to
reside in the compound. Indian relatives were rarely, if
ever, shut out at night and supplies and credit were not
generally denied. While the men were content the
system worked well; the Company received its furs and
the men managed a tolerable existence. Attempts on
the part of the Company to alter the easy relationship
between Indian and servant were always resisted.
Depending on the regional strength of the French
opposition, the men and their families could conspire
against the Company's trade. The French were very
close in the 1730s and it took little to divert trade to
them. What neither the London Committee nor some
of the chief factors seemed to appreciate was the
crucial influence of the servants and their Indian
families in the management of the trade.
The provisioning of the Company's post further
reflects the close relationship between Indian and
servant. Geese, the staple of the factory's diet, were
shot by the men while out at the goose camps with their
half-breed and Indian families. The quantities of geese
required to provision the fort were enormous. The
eighteen men at Moose in the 1730s usually received
per four-man mess, two or three salt geese per day, one
and one-half pounds of flour, slightly less than one
quart of pease, plus beer brewed at the factory.
Although this was supplemented in the summer with
fresh garden produce, for over eighty per cent of the
year the diet of salt geese was invariable and
monotonous. Only in September and May were fresh
geese available. At the same time the chief factor of the
fort had a diet that was considerably more English,
with fine cheeses and the best of wines. Combined with
the insecurity and monotony of the diet — for there
were days near the spring and fall hunts when the geese
barrels were empty — this preferential treatment
provoked many to near-riot. A full stomach meant a
passive servant, but stomachs were rarely full.
Accentuated by the vagaries of diet and climate,
disease was the other great problem at Moose in the
1730s. Pain and discomfort were normal, especially
after age thirty as the body succumbed to the ravages
of age and cold. George Howy, a member of the
Moose Council, was attacked by a severe case of gall-
stones. Arthritis was expected as a matter of course,
and it crippled many of the older servants. Venereal
disease was well known and the fear was always
present that the men would infect the natives. There
were, however, surprisingly few on-the-job accidents
and even fewer cases of frost-bite.
As might be expected mental health posed a
problem on the Bay. Many men suffered from winter
melancholia. The confinement indoors, the
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'Most chief factors alleged that the "private brandy" at the Bottom of the Ba\ was traded to the
servants by the captains and their crews in exchange for illicitly obtained furs . . .'
monotonous diet, the long dark hours, the isolation
and the constant fear of fire made life seem an endless
and fear-filled drudgery. Suicide was contemplated
with awesome frequency, and many macabre incidents
can be found in the factory's journals. Paranoia
reached considerable dimensions. Both James
Duffield and the chief at Albany, Joseph Isbister, felt
that their surgeons were trying to kill them, a plot for
which there is no evidence. Rather than submit to their
surgeons they chose to find comfort in each other's
tales of woe and treachery. Admittedly, the surgeons
were not of the best variety. The one at Moose, a resi-
dent of some forty years, was an alcoholic whose
careless approach to hygiene took on extraordinary
proportions; but like the other post doctors he
conceived himself to be irreplaceable and acted with
appropriate arrogance.
The politics of this melancholy society reflected
life's despondency and paranoia. There was inevitably
a faction comprised of the new servants and the sail-
ors, who preached discontent and insurrection. While
from time to time these malcontents were in the
majority they were rarely in control. Rather in the
1740s it was the 'country' or 'corrupted' faction who
exercised power with confidence and little opposition.
There was, of course, a small, albeit consistent, pro-
Company group who, by disposition, tended to
support authority no matter what its form.
Politics were to a large degree dictated by the chief
factor and the advisory council structure imposed by
the Company. In theory, the factor, with advice from
his council (who were appointed by the London
Committee on the recommendation of the factor), was
responsible for regulating all aspects of life. Usually
the council included the factory's surgeon, two or three
of the senior experienced servants, and the
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'Paranoia reached considerable dimensions. Both James Duffield and the chief at
Albany, Joseph Isbister, felt that their surgeons were trving to kill them . . . "
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accountant. At Moose one of the senior servants on
the council was Augustin Frost who, through the
power of his own personality, managed to have things
largely his own way. He could turn those with a
rebellious disposition in whatever direction he thought
appropriate.
At Moose the leaders of the rebellious trouble-
makers were the surgeon and a tradesman named
Joseph Robinson. In the 1740s Robinson acted as the
'Attorney General' for the factory's discontented,
because of his capacity to ferret out the legal niceties
which supported the men's demands. At one point
Robinson argued that since the men's contracts were
not stamped, as required by the Stamp Act, they were
not binding. The servants could therefore do as they
pleased.
This bag of legal tricks was added to every year with
the arrival of the annual ship. The sailors, a notably
rebellious lot, were always free with advice for their
brothers on the shores of the Bay. Many of the
servants were, in fact, recruited through the captain.
Coates, who served Moose during much of the 1700s,
had connections in Stockton, and many sailors and
servants came from there. They knew each other and
their fraternity seems to have been a strong one.
The factors for their part were not always happy
with the selection of new recruits: the tailor at Moose
was labelled as 'crazy', while the carpenters were
'indifferent and corrupted' or 'lazy and rebellious'. The
'corrupted' and 'rebellious' factions often formed
different groups among the servants. Nevertheless,
they tended to reinforce each other, since all those who
stayed for long periods acquired relatively common
Indian connections. New recruits were always ready
for trouble at the slightest hint of real restraint of their
activities. The Indian parties, like that headed by
Frost, tended on the other hand to tolerate the
Company's power so long as their lifestyle was not
affected. If the Company preached a reformation of
corruption, they quietly subverted and opposed, for in
the end they knew full well that no alternative to the
Company existed. The new society that had emerged
at Moose was dependent upon the Company's
technology, without which survival would be
impossible.
Tempered by Company dictate and Indian custom,
the society at Moose, by the 1730s, had evolved its own
unhappy structure. It was a society in which one's
position in the Company's hierarchy was only useful if
accepted by the old Indian hands whose families
controlled the post's trade. It was during the height of
Frost's influence over the Home Guard Indians that
the Company moved, through its newly appointed
chief factor, James Duffield, to reform the 'corrupted'
social order of Moose. But it was to be a Pyrrhic
victory which only succeeded in destroying the Indian
community that had become Moose Factory and in
pushing the factory servants to the edge of anarchy.
Duffield nearly destroyed the Company's trade in the
process.
Little is known of Duffield's early connections with
the Hudson's Bay Company; yet as a close friend of
and executor for a discontented Company servant, a
certain Mr Waggoner, he must have been familiar with
its operations. When Mr Waggoner died, a dispute
with Captain Coates over the will permanently secured
Duffield against the sea captains who annually
supplied the posts at the Bayside. Probably influenced
by the Waggoner fiasco, Duffield made it his mission
to reform the Bayside and the captains. The Company,
for its part, must have hoped that Duffield, with his
promised rule of iron, would rectify the corruption
that they believed was draining their revenues.
Immediately upon his arrival at Moose in the fall of
1741, James Duffield set about to effect a vigorous
reformation, but the factory council opposed him with
silence and deceit. Duffield grumbled that he felt he
had been
dropp'd down amongst a nest of free & accepted Masons, without
being initiated by ye bretheren, but as an Intruder on their laws, by
virtue of ye Compys authority: & therefore at all events I was to be
h o o d w i n k ' d & kep t f rom d i s c o v e r i n g t h e i r Secret
measures . . . such a Scandalous Society.
The council maintained its despondent silence as
Duffield assumed vigorous and absolute control of all
aspects of life. He banished the Indians, including the
men's families, from the factory's compound and
refused credit to all. Alcohol was attacked with equal
vigour. He confiscated first the surgeon's then the
servants', brandy.
During the following months Duffield piled
oppressive regulation upon regulation. Every evening
at sundown he locked the factory's gates himself, saw
every servant to bed at the eight o'clock bell, and
checked every change of the watch. He never went to
bed himself until all the men were asleep, about ten
o'clock, and he was always the first at work in the
morning, rousing any who slept too long. The men's
lockers were periodically searched for furs, and any fur
bedding was summarily confiscated. Any infractions
were severely and corporally punished.
As tension mounted in the post Duffield took to
carrying a brace of pistols and a stout cane to defend
himself. The men were increasingly unhappy at their
perceived loss of liberty which they likened to slavery.
William Drever, the new 'Attorney-General' became
the focal point of much of the resistance, as he plotted
insurrection with the factory's cook, surgeon and
carpenter. Determined to break the back of the
opposition, Duffield seized the carpenter, handcuffed
him and turned him outside the factory where he
stayed in a small Indian tent for three days and nights.
Such force continued to be applied with vigour. On
4 December 1741, a man was lashed to the stove, and
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'Everv evening at sundown hi1 lockeil the facior\'\ gait
himself, saw every servant to bed at the eight o'clock
bell, and checked every change of the watch.'
on 23 December a seaman, John Ridley, was caned for
being 'idle and shifting in his work'. Even on
Christmas Day, Duffield went about after eight in the
evening seizing brandy and generally putting a damper
merriment.
Duffield was particularly afraid that the men would
deliberately burn the fort down. Frost, for one,
attempted to fire one of the flankers. To prevent this,
Duffield usually chained trouble-makers to the stove
to make sure they would burn before the factory. Late
night drunken brawls and burning candles could also
cause accidental fires, so to make certain the men did
nothing but sleep after eight, the doors to the cabins
were removed. This, of course, also made it difficult to
hide Indian wives and to plot conspiracies.
Through terror, humiliation and constant vigilance
Duffield managed to keep the lid on rebellion. The
energy and techniques that kept him alive are much in
evidence in an incident that occurred in 1743. While
Duffield was writing up the sailing orders for the
master of the Moose sloop, the crew was in the factory
spiriting up a rebellion against him with their
'countrymen', the factory servants. Mr Longland, the
master and a favourite of Duffield's, was the first to be
attacked. Duffield was to be next. Hearing a
disturbance, and Mr Longland's cries, Duffield
grabbed his pistols, raced into the factory's court and
chased the conspirators back to the sloop. Later that
evening after careful inquiry he seized the ringleader,
one Porto Bello, whom he had whipped the year
before. When Porto Bello threatened to burn the fort,
himself included, Duffield locked him up in a small
shed with seven biscuits and one gallon of water. Then
in another fit of bravado Porto Bello swore to hang
himself. Duffield obliged by providing the rope, but
Porto Bello complained that the rope was not long
enough, whereupon Duffield called all the servants
together for the final humiliation of their hero whom
he provided with a very long piece of rope indeed.
Porto Bello again refused and threatened starvation,
as a dramatic but less immediate form of suicide; but
by now his credibility had evaporated. Duffield
remained in control and the men were left to look for a
new leader.
While congratulating himself on keeping riot at a
minimum, Duffield was well aware, even before 1743,
that his life was not safe. As early as September 1741,
as the fort restrictions grew more trying, hints of
Indian-engendered assassinations were made by some
of the servants. Given the close connection with the
Home Guard Indians this was a very distinct
possibility, but why these threats were never carried
out is difficult to determine. Nevertheless, Duffield
chose to keep his distance from the Indians.
Duffield also systematically set about to break
Frost's control. From the very first, Frost and the
council had continually interceded on the men's
behalf, begging Duffield to moderate his regime.
Initially Duffield privately reprimanded the council
and forbade their continuing connection with the
Indians. In March of 1742, however, he decided upon
another solution. He was determined to prohibit Frost
any connection with the Indians and to send him home
in September when the annual ships arrived. That
winter and spring Duffield kept a careful eye on Frost
from the factory windows, and whenever he saw an
Indian approaching he would dash out to prevent the
meeting.
Nevertheless the men schemed with the Indians that
winter and plots were hatched in rapid succession.
Most of these Duffield held in utter contempt.
According to him the men were
but very Shallow pated politicians & [I] can easily dive into ye
bottom of all their plots, before they are ripe for execution.
He felt that a rebellion of the Home Guard was
unlikely; but while there was no uprising, the Home
Guard, at Frost's instigation, refused to provide geese
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\or fish for the Company's table. Frost felt that lack of
food due to mismanagement on Duffield's part would
be sufficient excuse for a rebellion, which might then
persuade the Company to recall the chief factor.
More importantly, Frost connived with the Home
Guard to trade with the French. Some contacts were
made but their success was negligible. Supplies from
the French, especially powder, could not be
guaranteed. In fact Duffield's careful and rigorous
trade had pushed the overplus from 922 13/60 Made
Beaver in Richard Staunton's last year to 1936 21/40
in his own last year. Duffield finally broke the back of
the Home Guard resistance by sending Frost to
Albany in July. Without their leader and with
generous gifts to the Indian leader, the reluctant trade
with Moose continued.
The factory's servants were not Duffield's only
object of attack. He also believed that the captains
were at the root of much of the discontent. Captain
Coates was accused of interfering with the internal
operations of the factory, landing brandy illicitly,
engaging in clandestine trade, and ransoming the
annual cargo. The captains he argued were also
responsible for much of the bad behaviour of the men.
The Company must not
Suffer their Sea Commanders any longer to Uphold laziness,
sottishness and disobedience, by which they have so long found it
their interest.
Duffield, however, never managed to break the
powers of the captains, who had the ear of the London
Committee.
The London Committee was, for its part, not
impressed with Duffield despite his apparent
successes. On 5 May 1743, they publicly chastised him
in their annual letter to the factory's council:
[We] do believe that the Proceedings of your Chief by Governing
with a Rod of Iron, causes disturbances in the Factory, and thereby
is detrimental to our Affairs.
At the same time he was urged to maintain friendly
relations with the sea captains. There was to be no
more premeditated conflict. Whether Duffield would
have moderated his regime will never be known, for
during the winter of 1743-44 his health deteriorated
rapidly and in August 1744, he returned home.
After Duffield's departure, the factory slowly
returned to its old ways. George Howy was appointed
by Duffield to act in his stead. Having maintained a
quiet opposition during the previous four years, Howy
spent the next months trying to put things right. He
had deplored Duffield's rough usage of the Indians,
and his displays of favouritism. Howy's immediate
problem was to get the Indians hunting geese again
since during the previous starvation winter, Duffield
had shut the Indians out of the factory. In order to
survive they had plundered the Eskimos instead. That
winter of 1744-45 Howy let the indigent Indians into
'Duffield was particularly afraid that the men would
deliberately burn the fort down. Frost, for one, attempted
to fire one of the flankers.'
the factory, and re-established a close relationship
with the Home Guard. The servants were allowed
more freedom and the rebellions of the past years
vanished. Once again 'corruption' reigned; Duffield's
reformation had been undone.
Actually there were few Duffields at the Bayside to
disrupt the development of the staple society. Most of
the chief factors rose through the ranks and were
aware of the exigencies of life at the factories. Most
acquiesced in silence, and little leaked to London in
the journals. The fur trade had produced a society of
its own that was half Indian, half European, at once
independent of the Company in terms of its internal
structure, yet dependent upon the Company for its
technology. By virtue of their situation and their
function the communities of the early eighteenth
century on the shores of Hudson Bay had to create
their own social patterns over which the Company had
little influence. Indeed, attempts to impose an external
and essentially foreign order upon the Bayside
societies always served to retard rather than advance
Company business on Hudson Bay. +
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